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Introduction and summary
“How do banks make money?” is a deceivingly sim-
ple question. Banks make money by charging interest
on loans, of course. In fact, there used to be a standard,
tongue-in-cheek answer to this question: According
to the “3-6-3 rule,” bankers paid a 3 percent rate of
interest on deposits, charged a 6 percent rate of interest
on loans, and then headed to the golf course at 3 o’clock.
Like most good jokes, the 3-6-3 rule mixes a
grain of truth with a highly simplified view of reality.
To be sure, the interest margin banks earn by interme-
diating between depositors and borrowers continues
to be the primary source of profits for most banking
companies. But banks also earn substantial amounts
of noninterest income by charging their customers fees
in exchange for a variety of financial services. Many
of these financial services are traditional banking ser-
vices: transaction services like checking and cash
management; safe-keeping services like insured de-
posit accounts and safety deposit boxes; investment
services like trust accounts and long-run certificates
of deposit (CDs); and insurance services like annuity
contracts. In other traditional areas of banking—such
as consumer lending and retail payments—the wide-
spread application of new financial processes and
pricing methods is generating increased amounts of
fee income for many banks. And in recent years,
banking companies have taken advantage of deregu-
lation to generate substantial amounts of noninterest
income from nontraditional activities like investment
banking, securities brokerage, insurance agency and
underwriting, and mutual fund sales.
Remarkably, noninterest income now accounts
for nearly half of all operating income generated by
U.S. commercial banks. As illustrated in figure 1, fee
income has more than doubled as a share of commer-
cial bank operating income since the early 1980s.
This shift has been larger than most industry experts
expected, and we have only recently begun to under-
stand the implications of this shift for the financial
performance of banking companies. Only a handful
of systematic academic studies have been completed
thus far, and those studies have tended to contradict the
conventional industry beliefs about noninterest income.
Many in the banking industry continue to discount,
underestimate, or simply misunderstand the manner
in which increased noninterest income has affected
the financial performance of banking companies.
This article documents the dramatic increase in
noninterest income at U.S. banking companies during
the past two decades, the myriad forces that have driv-
en this increase, and the somewhat surprising impli-
cations of these changes for the financial performance
of commercial banks. We pay special attention to two
fundamental misunderstandings about noninterest in-
come at commercial banks. The first is the belief that
noninterest income and fee income are more stable
than interest-based income. We review the most recent
evidence from academic studies that strongly suggest—
contrary to the original expectations of many—that
increased reliance on fee-based activities tends to in-
crease rather than decrease the volatility of banks’
earnings streams. The second misunderstanding is
the belief that banks earn noninterest income chiefly
from nontraditional, nonbanking activities. We perform
some calculations of our own and demonstrate that
payment services—one of the most traditional of all35 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE 1
Noninterest and net income as a % of total operating
income in U.S. commercial banking, 1970–2003
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banking services—remain the single largest source of
noninterest income at most U.S. banking companies.
This is the first of two articles in this issue of
Economic Perspectives that examine “how banks make
money.” The companion piece that follows describes the
wide diversity of business strategies being used by com-
mercial banking companies—some of which rely dis-
proportionately on activities that generate noninterest
income—and compares and contrasts the risk-return pro-
files of banking companies that employ those strategies.
Noninterest income, deregulation, and
technological change
Banks earn noninterest income by producing both
traditional banking services and nontraditional finan-
cial services. In fact, even before deregulation provided
banks with increased opportunities to sell nontraditional
fee-based services (say, in the mid-1980s), noninter-
est income already represented about $1 out of $4 of
operating income generated by commercial banks.
And the dramatic increase in noninterest income at
U.S. banking companies over the past two decades
reflects not only a diversification of banks into non-
traditional activities, but also a shift in the way banks
earn money from their traditional banking activities.
Table 1 organizes selected fee-generating activities
into two groups: traditional activities that have always
been provided by commercial banks and nontradition-
al financial services that banks have only recently
begun to provide. (This is a selected list of activities
for illustrative purposes only and is not
meant to cover all fee-based activities.)
The first column in table 1 would
have been empty for the years prior to
the deregulation of the financial industry.
Deregulation opened the door for com-
mercial banks to earn fee income from
investment banking, merchant banking,
insurance agency, securities brokerage,
and other nontraditional financial services.
The key deregulation was the Gramm–
Leach–Bliley (GLB) Act of 1999, which
created a financial holding company
(FHC) framework that allowed common
ownership of, and formal affiliation be-
tween, banking and nonbanking activities.
Although GLB was the “big bang” that
eliminated most of the Glass–Steagall
Act (1933) prohibitions on mixing com-
mercial banking and other financial ser-
vices, partial deregulation had occurred
during the 1980s and 1990s. In the late
1980s the Federal Reserve allowed commercial
banks to set up investment banking subsidiaries with
limited underwriting powers, and in the mid-1990s
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency grant-
ed national banks the power to sell insurance from
offices in small towns.
The fees generated by these new, nontraditional
activities are uneven across banking companies. On
the one hand, investment banking has been a natural
addition to the product lines of large banking compa-
nies that have large corporate clients. On the other
hand, insurance agency has been a good fit for bank-
ing companies of all sizes that wish to cross-sell new
financial services to their retail (household) clients.
In contrast, the fee-generating activities listed in
the second column of table 1 are very traditional bank-
ing activities. Banks have always earned noninterest
income from their depositors, charging fees on a va-
riety of transaction services (for example, checking
and money orders), safe-keeping services (for exam-
ple, insured deposit accounts, safety deposit boxes),
and cash management services (for example, lock box
or payroll processing). Other traditional lines of busi-
ness for which banks have always earned fee income
include trust services provided to a wealthy retail cli-
entele and providing letters of credit (as opposed to
immediate dispersal of loan funds) to corporate clients.
In recent years, advances in information, com-
munications, and financial technologies have allowed
banks to produce many of their traditional services
more efficiently. These efficiencies not only reduced
Note: The two series sum to 100 percent.36 4Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
TABLE 1
Selected sources of noninterest income
at banking companies
per unit costs, enhanced service quality, and increased
customer convenience, but also represented a source
of increased fee income for banks. Some examples
are displayed in the third column of table 1. Advances
in credit-scoring models and asset-backed securities
markets have transformed the production of consumer
credit and home mortgages from a traditional portfo-
lio lending process, where banks earn mostly interest
income, to a transaction lending process, in which
banks earn mostly noninterest income (for example,
loan origination fees and loan servicing fees). Advances
in communications and information technologies
have led to new production processes for transactions
and liquidity services, such as ATMs (automated teller
machines) and online bill-pay, and deposit customers
have been willing to pay fees for these conveniences.
(The phase out of Regulation Q ceilings on deposit
interest rates assisted banks in this regard, allowing
them to price depositor services in a more rational
and competitive fashion.)
Similar to the noninterest income generated by
nontraditional activities, the fee income derived by
these new production methods is uneven across bank-







Traditional production methods New production methods
Deposit account services Deposit account services
(e.g., safe-keeping, checking) (e.g., online bill-pay, ATMs)
Lending Lending
(e.g., letters of credit) (e.g., securitization, servicing)
Cash management Cash management
(e.g., payroll processing, (e.g., lock box check
traditional lock box) conversion to electronic
ACH payments)
aA merchant bank invests its own capital in leveraged buyouts, corporate
acquisitions, and other structured finance transactions. The merchant bank
typically arranges credit financing, but does not hold the loans to maturity.
Source: Fitch (2000).
significant scale economies, and as a re-
sult fee income from securitized consumer
and mortgage lending has flowed pre-
dominantly (though not completely) to
large banking companies. In contrast, the
scaleable technologies necessary to pro-
duce ATM and Internet banking services
are accessible to even relatively small
banks.
Financial statement data
Taking advantage of the highly de-
tailed financial statements that commer-
cial banks and bank holding companies
provide to their regulators, we collected
data for established U.S. banking compa-
nies in 1986, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2003.
This multi-year, multi-company dataset
allows us to observe how business strate-
gies differ across banking companies in a
given year and how banking strategies
have changed over the past two decades
as regulatory, technological, and competi-
tive conditions have changed.1 For the
purpose of our analysis, an “established
banking company” is either an indepen-
dent commercial bank that is at least ten
years old or a bank holding company
(BHC) or financial holding company (FHC)
that controls one or more commercial banks that are
on average at least ten years old. These categories of
banking companies are inclusive of all mature U.S.
commercial bank charters and, as such, they include
banking companies of all sizes—from small, indepen-
dently organized community banks to large financial
holding companies—that operate using a diverse array
of banking business strategies.
We approach these data somewhat differently
than most financial analyses of the commercial bank-
ing industry. First, we pay as much attention to bank
income statements as we do to bank balance sheets.
Financial analysis of commercial banks often concen-
trates on bank balance sheets, which display the most
direct evidence of banks’ traditional intermediation
activities between depositors and borrowers. (Deposits
are the largest single item on the liability side of
most banks’ balance sheets, and loans are the largest
single item on the asset side of most banks’ balance
sheets.) But balance sheets have become an increas-
ingly incomplete records of banks’ profit-generating
activities; they convey very little information about
the fee-based activities that now generate over 40 per-
cent of total operating income in the banking industry.
Trust account services
(e.g., wealth management)37 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Some of these fee-based activities are traditional
(like providing services to depositors and private
banking clients); some are new to commercial banks
(like investment banking, venture capital, and insur-
ance underwriting); and some are traditional banking
activities produced using new, nontraditional methods
(like automated lending processes). Because income
statements display the revenues and expenses gener-
ated by all of a bank’s activities—whether or not they
are represented on the balance sheet—we analyze bank
income statements first before moving on to bank
balance sheets.
Second, we construct financial ratios two differ-
ent ways: We construct composite (or size-weighted)
financial ratios using aggregate data for the entire
commercial banking industry; and we construct bank-
level (or unweighted) financial ratios using data from
individual commercial banks. The composite finan-
cial ratios are informative about the overall product
mix, financing mix, risk, and profitability of the com-
mercial banking industry, but these ratios may not be
descriptive of the “typical” commercial bank because
large banks dominate the aggregate data. To the ex-
tent that a typical bank exists (and this is a problem-
atic concept in itself, as discussed in the companion
article that follows), it would be better described by
taking the average of the bank-level ratios. For some
financial ratios the size-weighted and unweighted av-
erages have similar values; but for other ratios these
two approaches yield substantially different values.
As we shall see, these differences can reveal important
information about how commercial banks make money.
Large size allows banking companies to serve large cor-
porate clients and provides them with access to low-cost,
high-volume production, distribution, and marketing
processes. But large size can make it difficult for
banking companies to provide personalized retail ser-
vice and/or build relationships with their small busi-
ness loan customers.
The financial data for independent banks were drawn
primarily from the Reports of Condition and Income
(call reports), and the financial data for BHCs and FHCs
were drawn primarily from the Federal Reserve Board
FR Y-9C reports. These data were augmented with data
from a number of other sources, including the Federal
Reserve Board National Information Center’s (NIC)
structure database, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration’s Summary of Deposits database, and the Center
for Research on Stock Prices (CRSP). To be included in
the dataset in any given year, a banking company had to
be domestically owned, have positive amounts of loans
and transaction deposits, have positive book value, and
be FDIC-insured or own at least one commercial bank
that was FDIC-insured. We express all data in thousands
of 2003 dollars, unless otherwise indicated.
Table 2 displays some basic summary statistics
for each of the years in our 1986–2003 sample peri-
od. The number of banking companies has declined
over time for two reasons: nearly a thousand com-
mercial banks failed during the first ten years of our
sample period and, in each year of our sample peri-
od, hundreds of banking companies were merged or
acquired. These trends were mitigated to some extent
by the thousands of new banking companies that
were started up during the 1980s and 1990s (entering
our dataset upon turning ten-years old) and by the
entry of some nonbank FHCs (investment banks, in-
surance companies, and securities firms) after 1999
under the provisions of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act.
The size of the average banking company increased
substantially during our sample period, in terms of assets,
operating income, book value, employees, and branches.
TABLE 2
Size of banking companies in DeYoung–Rice dataset,
thousands of 2003 dollars, unless indicated otherwise
1986 1990 1995 2000 2003
Number of banking companies 3,799 3,127 2,924 2,644 2,662
Assets Mean 552,527 1,019,863 1,454,478 2,346,017 2,746,374
Median 46,720 56,083 95,565 202,791 232,224
Operating income Mean 25,701 53,062 78,535 142,446 157,582
Median 2,085 2,431 4,663 9,362 10,536
Book value Mean 33,387 62,097 115,193 182,256 225,723
Median 4,358 5,252 10,406 18,230 21,475
No. of full-time employees Mean 34.76 35.78 39.35 42.38 44.31
Median 18 18 21 20 20
No. of branches Mean 3.94 8.71 16.82 21.32 22.06
Median 1 1 3 5 538 4Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
Noninterest income: Evidence from the
income statement
Table 3 displays income statement data from the
five years contained in our 1986–2003 dataset. Each
of the revenue, expense, and profit items is expressed
as a percentage of operating income, except return on
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). The size-
weighted ratios are indicative of the composition of
total industry revenues, expenses, and profits. The
unweighted ratio averages are indicative of the com-
position of revenues, expenses, and profits at the
average bank.2
The most systematic change in bank income
statements during our sample period is the increasing
incidence of noninterest income, which now accounts
for about 20 percent of operating income at the aver-
age commercial banking company (up from about 13
percent in 1986) and about 47 percent of total indus-
try operating income (up from about 30 percent). In
other words, today the banking industry generates
slightly more than $1 of net interest income for every
$1 of noninterest income, compared with just two de-
cades ago when this industry multiple was well over
$2. As discussed above, the increased importance of
fee income at commercial banking companies is a di-
rect result of structural changes like industry deregu-
lation, new information technologies, and financial
innovation. The companion article that follows dis-
cusses the implications of these changes for competi-
tive strategies at commercial banking companies.
The expense data suggest that the banking industry
has become more cost efficient over the past two
decades—noninterest expenses currently consume
about $0.59 of every $1 of operating income generated
by commercial banking companies, down dramatically
from about $0.69 in 1986. A large part of this decline
is due to increased competitive pressure and the incen-
tives this creates for banking companies to operate
TABLE 3
Income statement items, as a percent of operating income, except ROA and ROE
1986 1990 1995 2000 2003
Number of banking companies 3,799 3,127 2,924 2,644 2,662
Size-weighted averages
Net interest income 70.1 65.2 64.1 51.2 52.9
Noninterest income 29.9 34.8 35.9 48.8 47.1
Noninterest expense 69.2 69.7 63.8 63.0 59.3
  Labor expense 34.4 33.6 31.6 29.9 30.2
  Full-time employees (workers per $mil.) 8.6 7.4 6.1 4.4 4.3
  Premises expense 11.4 11.4 9.6 8.0 8.0
  Other noninterest expense 23.4 24.6 22.5 25.1 21.1
Provisions for loan losses 14.6 18.1 4.7 7.6 7.3
Taxes and extraordinary items 1.2 2.9 10.9 10.6 9.9
Net income (ROS) 15.0 9.3 20.6 18.8 23.5
Return on assets (ROA) 0.0070 0.0048 0.0111 0.0114 0.0135
Return on equity (ROE) 0.1152 0.0789 0.1408 0.1471 0.1641
Unweighted averages
Net interest income 87.1 85.0 84.3 83.0 79.7
Noninterest income 12.9 15.0 15.7 17.0 20.3
Noninterest expense 67.4 69.5 65.7 64.6 66.2
  Labor expense 34.5 35.4 34.6 35.0 36.7
  Full time employees (workers per $mil.) 10.3 10.1 9.0 8.1 7.8
  Premises expense 9.7 9.3 8.9 9.2 9.0
  Other noninterest expense 23.2 24.8 22.1 20.4 20.4
Provisions for loan losses 18.1 8.3 3.4 5.2 4.9
Taxes and extraordinary items 18.0 13.9 12.4 13.4 11.2
Net income (ROS) 14.5 16.6 21.9 21.9 22.5
ROA 0.0066 0.0074 0.0106 0.0105 0.0105
ROE 0.0476 0.0682 0.1031 0.1064 0.1102
Note: ROS is return on sales.39 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
more efficiently. Shifts in banking product mix and
the introduction of new ways to produce and distribute
traditional banking products likewise have contribut-
ed to this decline in expenses. Note that the number
of full-time employees per dollar of operating income
has fallen precipitously over time, while industry-wide
labor expenses have declined only marginally and
have actually increased at the average bank. These
conflicting trends provide evidence that new banking
products and production methods require a more high-
ly skilled work force and, hence, higher salaries and
benefits to attract and retain these workers. For exam-
ple, while low-wage bank tellers have become less
necessary due to ATMs and online banking, high-wage
finance and information professionals have become
more necessary to manage these systems and the
growing array of products offered over them.
Labor expenses, premises expenses, and other
noninterest expenses have all declined over time for
large banks (which dominate the size-weighted ratio
averages), but in contrast, only one of these three ex-
pense items has declined for the average bank (which
is better represented by the unweighted ratio averages).
As large banking companies have grown even larger
via industry consolidation, they have increasingly
benefited from scale economies that drive down per-
unit costs; moreover, large banking companies are
more likely to participate in high-volume, fee-based
activities like automated lending, online banking, and
mass marketing campaigns that benefit from scale
economies. Naturally, the small banks cannot benefit
as much from these economies of scale—not only
because of their small size, but because many small
banks practice more personal, relationship-based
strategies that require relatively more customer-ser-
vice labor inputs and relatively more physical spaces
to interact with their customers.
Although expenses have declined less for the
average banking company than for the industry over-
all, the proof of improved bank efficiency is in the
profit pudding: net income has increased substantial-
ly, to just over 20 percent of operating income for
both the average banking company and the industry
as a whole. Because this return-on-sales (ROS) profit
measure is a relatively uncommon way to express
banking profitability, we also include the more famil-
iar ROA and ROE measures, both of which have in-
creased over time as well. This broad improvement
in profitability has three fundamental causes: im-
proved cost and revenue efficiency due to advances
in information technology and financial processes;
improved cost and revenue efficiency in response to
the competitive pressures brought on by industry de-
regulation; and the generally improved banking envi-
ronment starting in the mid-1990s, reflected in the
table as reduced loan loss provisioning.
The ROA and ROE data suggest that the average
bank—with an ROA of 1.05 percent and an ROE of
11.02 percent in 2003—is less profitable compared
with the industry-wide aggregate ROA and ROE
measures of 1.35 percent and 16.41 percent, respec-
tively. As with many of the other differences we ob-
serve in the financial data, higher levels of noninterest
activities at some banks also help explain these dif-
ferences in the ROA and ROE measures. Because
large banking companies tend to generate large amounts
of fee income from activities that are not found on
the balance sheet (for example, fee income from se-
curitized lending activities), these banks will natural-
ly appear to be more profitable using an ROA measure.
Additionally, because large banking companies tend
to be more diversified across product lines and cus-
tomer bases and are more likely to use derivatives se-
curities and complex modeling techniques to mitigate
risk, they can operate with a smaller cushion of equity
capital. Therefore, they will also appear to be more
profitable using an ROE measure. Thus, for slightly
different reasons, large banking companies will have
higher traditional accounting performance measures
than smaller banking companies, all else being equal.
Note, however, that ROS, ROA, and ROE are not
risk-adjusted performance measures and, thus, using
these measures to compare the profitability of differ-
ent banks is an incomplete performance analysis. We
compare and contrast risk-adjusted financial performance
of different types of commercial banking companies in
the companion article that follows this one.
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The dramatic increases in noninterest income
over the past two decades have not occurred in isola-
tion from other banking activities and, as such, they
have left a trail not only on bank income statements
but also on bank balance sheets. The increase in non-
interest income has occurred in consort with changes
in virtually every other area of commercial bank ac-
tivities, including interest income, interest and nonin-
terest expenses, bank asset mix, and bank funding
sources. We now turn briefly to an analysis of bank
balance sheets to illustrate these changes.
Assets
As displayed in table 4, there has been a marked
change in asset mix since the mid-1980s. For the40 4Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
average banking company (unweighted ratio averages),
the big story is increased investment efficiency. In
1986 the average banking company had 50 percent
of its assets invested in low-yielding assets like cash,
securities, and fed funds, and only about 47 percent
in loans. But by 2003, investments in loans at the av-
erage banking company were nearly twice as large as
investments in lower yielding assets (61.1 percent
versus 34.9 percent). These figures are clear indications
that, despite the increased importance of noninterest
income, the survival of the average banking franchise
continues to depend on traditional intermediation
from depositors to borrowers.
Low-yielding cash balances have also declined
for the industry as a whole (size-weighted ratio aver-
ages), but investments in loans have also fallen sub-
stantially, from 62.3 percent to 52.5 percent of assets.
But this does not necessarily indicate a reduction in
investment efficiency. These data are consistent with
a shift in the production functions of large banking
companies away from traditional portfolio lending
and its reliance on interest income and toward securi-
tizable transaction lending (especially credit cards and
home mortgages) that relies on noninterest income
from loan origination and loan servicing fees. The
10 percentage point reduction in loan assets has been
more than offset by a 12 percentage point increase in
“other assets,” such as the fair value of derivative in-
struments used to hedge against interest rate and for-
eign currency risk and receivables on the interest rate
portion of asset-backed securities (IO strips).
Real estate loans have become a much more im-
portant part of bank loan portfolios over the past two
decades. A number of factors played a role in this, in-
cluding easier access to mortgage financing, the 1986
tax reform act that eliminated the consumer debt in-
terest deduction but maintained the mortgage interest
deduction, an increase in home ownership rates, the
run-up in single-family home prices in many markets,
as well as a need for banking companies to replace
lost market share in commercial and industrial (C&I)
loans. Between 1986 and 2003, C&I loans declined
from 31.53 percent to just 18.90 percent of the overall
industry loan portfolio, as large business borrowers
began to bypass banks in favor of direct finance (for
example, issuing commercial paper or high-yield debt),
and nonbank competitors such as insurance companies
and investment banks began to compete with banks
for the remainder of the shrinking C&I loan market.
For some banks, increased fee income from issuing
letters of credit has softened the loss of C&I market
share.3 In contrast, both C&I loans and commercial
real estate loans—on-balance sheet, relationship-based
loans that generate interest income—have increased
substantially for the typical banking company.
Financing and deposit mix
Deposits are the single most important source of
financing for banking companies. As shown in table 5,
about 57 percent of the banking industry’s assets, and
about 82 percent of the typical banking company’s
assets, were financed with deposits in 2003. Commu-
nity banks use higher levels of deposit funding, and
their noninterest income streams depend heavily on
depositor service charges. However, even these high
levels of deposit funding mark a decline over the past
two decades, in favor of increased funding from federal
funds, subordinated debt, “other liabilities,” and equity
financing. This reflects at least three developments:
increased competition from nonbanks (for example,
mutual funds, brokerage accounts) for household and
business deposits; expanded ability of large banking
companies to raise debt in financial markets (for ex-
ample, commercial paper, subordinated debt); and
regulations that now require banks to hold higher
levels of equity capital than in the past.
The composition of deposits has also changed over
time, and these trends reflect differences in the ways
that large and small banks do business. For the typi-
cal banking company, transaction deposits have held
relatively steady over the years—at about 28 percent
of total deposits in general and about 15 percent of
total deposits for banks’ business clients (demand de-
posits). Thus, relationships with depositors and ac-
cess to the payments system continue to be essential
parts of most banking companies’ business strategies.
In contrast, transaction deposits have declined dra-
matically at the industry level (from 29.8 percent to
15.0 percent of total deposits) since 1986.
A closer look at noninterest income and risk
Both traditional and nontraditional banking activ-
ities generate noninterest income. Traditional fee-gen-
erating activities include transaction services for retail
and business depositors (although in recent years a
growing percentage of these fees has been charged
for nontraditional technologies like online bill-pay)
and fiduciary services for high net worth retail clients.
Nontraditional fee-generating activities include invest-
ment banking, insurance underwriting and agency,
and venture capital. Finally, banking firms generate
a substantial amount of noninterest income by using
nontraditional methods to produce traditional banking
services. For example, in a traditional banking model,
loan servicing fees and securitization fees do not ex-
ist, because banks hold the loans they originate in their
own portfolios and service these loans themselves.41 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 4
Asset items, as a percent of total assets
1986 1990 1995 2000 2003
Number of banking companies 3,799 3,127 2,924 2,644 2,662
Size-weighted averages
Cash 11.5 8.7 6.5 5.1 4.5
Securities 16.5 16.6 18.1 16.2 17.6
Fed funds sold 3.1 2.4 3.9 5.4 6.5
Loans 62.3 64.3 58.8 57.0 52.7
Allowance for loan losses (0.9) (1.6) (1.2) (1.0) (0.9)
Fixed assets 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.2 1.1
Other assets 5.9 8.0 12.4 15.9 18.4
Loan items as % of loans
Real estate loans 32.35 40.02 43.37 45.04 53.74
  Residential mortgages N/A 20.37 26.29 25.97 32.50
  Home equity loans N/A 3.00 3.30 3.51 6.96
  Commercial real estate loans N/A 17.45 15.19 17.33 19.47
  Agricultural land loans N/A 0.57 0.64 0.69 0.73
Consumer loans 21.25 19.41 13.81 11.08 17.09
  Credit cards N/A 0.18 7.24 5.70 6.96
Commercial and industrial loans 31.53 28.62 25.42 27.50 18.90
Agricultural production loans 1.39 1.09 1.07 0.94 0.79
Other loans N/A 10.87 16.33 15.44 9.48
Unweighted averages
Cash 9.1 7.2 5.5 4.8 5.2
Securities 33.0 32.9 32.1 26.3 26.1
Fed funds sold 7.9 6.5 5.1 3.6 3.4
Loans 46.6 49.7 54.0 61.7 61.1
Allowance for loan losses (0.7) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9)
Fixed assets 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.8
Other assets 2.5 2.8 2.4 2.6 3.2
Loan items as % of loans
Real estate loans 40.53 46.77 55.39 60.39 65.91
  Residential mortgages N/A 27.03 29.74 28.53 27.07
  Home equity loans N/A 1.03 1.46 1.72 2.62
  Commercial real estate loans N/A 13.90 20.50 26.89 33.51
  Agricultural land loans N/A 5.61 4.90 4.72 5.04
Consumer loans 23.89 20.77 16.95 13.23 10.46
  Credit cards N/A 0.25 0.71 0.49 0.44
Commercial and industrial loans 3.72 6.09 8.27 11.73 10.44
Agricultural production loans 15.05 13.20 9.59 6.90 5.94
Other loans N/A 12.76 9.34 7.21 6.72
Notes: Columns may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding errors. N/A indicates that data were not available in 1986. The “other assets”
category combines a variety of assets that are not separately reported to regulators at the banking holding company level, including (but not
limited to) interest receivable on loans and securities, derivative securities not held for trading purposes, equity securities without readily determinable
fair values (for example, stock in a Federal Home Loan Bank or equity holdings in corporate joint ventures), prepaid expenses, repossessed
property such as automobiles and boats, credit or debit card sales slips in the process of collection, and assets held in charitable trusts.
By some measures, noninterest income might be
characterized as a large-bank phenomenon. As shown
in table 6 (p. 47), noninterest income accounts for only
about $1 in $5 of operating income at the average
banking company with assets less than $1 billion but
about $1 in $2 of operating income at the average
banking company with assets greater than $25 billion.
Moreover, the lion’s share of noninterest income is being
generated by a very small number of banking compa-
nies: In our sample, 84 percent of all noninterest
income in 2003 was generated by just 1 percent of
the banking companies (not shown).
Scale economies in production are one reason that
noninterest income represents such disparate amounts42 4Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
of income at large and small banking companies.
For example, loan servicing and other automated tech-
niques, which generate large amounts of fee income
relative to traditional production techniques, are most
cost-effective when used at high volumes. Similarly,
investment banking and other nontraditional banking
products that generate large amounts of fee income
tend to be practiced at banking companies that are
large enough to service big corporate clients.
The composition of noninterest income also
differs across banking companies of different sizes.
Large banking companies generate disproportionate-
ly more noninterest income from securitizing and
servicing mortgage and credit card loans, because
the automated production processes used to produce
these services exhibit substantial scale economies.
Similarly, large banking companies are better able
to employ the concentrations of financial experts
and develop the institutional information databases
necessary for the production of investment banking,
insurance underwriting, and private banking (fiduciary)
services. However, there are other areas in which
smaller banking companies generate a higher percent-
age of noninterest income than larger banking com-
panies. Because small banking companies rely more
on core deposit funding (such as household and small
business checking accounts) than do larger banks,
deposit service charges comprise a large part of their
fee income base. And fee income from the sale of in-
surance products shows no size bias—possibly be-
cause small banking companies have been successful
at cross-selling insurance products to their existing
household and small business clients.
TABLE 5
Liability and equity items, as a percent of total assets
1986 1990 1995 2000 2003
Number of banking companies 3,799 3,127 2,924 2,644 2,662
Size-weighted averages
Deposits 74.1 75.7 66.7 58.2 57.2
Fed funds purchased 7.6 5.2 7.2 8.7 9.3
Subordinated debt 0.5 0.7 1.7 1.8 1.9
Other liabilities 11.7 12.3 16.5 23.5 23.4
Equity 6.0 6.1 7.9 7.8 8.2
Deposit items as % of deposits
Transactions deposits 29.8 25.8 27.0 17.4 15.0
  Demand deposits 21.9 17.6 18.9 13.4 10.5
Nontransactions deposits 70.2 74.2 73.0 82.6 85.0
  Savings and MMDAs 38.0 34.1 42.3 51.2 61.4
  Small CDs 20.0 26.8 23.1 18.9 12.7
  Large CDs 12.2 13.3 7.8 12.5 11.0
Unweighted averages
Deposits 88.3 87.8 85.6 82.7 81.8
Fed funds purchased 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.8 1.7
Subordinated debt 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Other liabilities 1.4 1.8 2.3 5.0 6.0
Equity 9.4 9.5 10.7 10.4 10.3
Deposit items as % of deposits
Transactions deposits 28.7 27.4 30.4 27.0 27.6
  Demand deposits 16.5 14.5 16.4 15.3 15.2
Nontransactions deposits 71.3 72.6 69.6 73.0 72.4
  Savings and MMDAs 23.9 20.0 23.2 23.7 29.5
  Small CDs 38.0 41.7 35.6 33.4 27.6
  Large CDs 9.0 10.6 10.5 15.3 14.8
Notes: Columns may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding errors. The “other liabilities” category combines a variety of liabilities that are
not separately reported to regulators at the banking holding company level, including (but not limited to) accounts payable, deferred
compensation, trust preferred securities, dividends declared but not yet payable, allowances for credit losses on off-balance-sheet credit
exposures, and selected insurance subsidiary liabilities (such as unearned premiums and claims expense reserves). MMDA is money market
deposit account and CD is certificate of deposit.43 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE 2
“Is there a connection between high levels
of noninterest income and earnings stability?”
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Noninterest income and financial performance
As discussed above, increased competition from
nonbanks and out-of-state banks in the years follow-
ing deregulation put downward pressure on the prof-
itability of commercial banking companies. Banks
were sensitive to these coming challenges long be-
fore deregulation was fully implemented. For exam-
ple, in a 1983 study the Texas Bankers Association
concluded that if the banking industry was “to re-
main profitable in a deregulated environment, it
must fundamentally change the way in which it
makes money.” The study found that in order to off-
set expected declines in net interest margins due to
post-deregulation competition, fee income would
have to increase from about 15 percent of total in-
come to over 50 percent of total income by 1986
(Lane, Friars, and Goldberg, 1983). As we have seen
above, many banking companies heeded the spirit
of this advice by offering an expanded menu of fee-
based products and services.
The financial consequences of these strategic
shifts toward fee income were not well understood at
the time. The upward trend in noninterest income
during the 1990s was generally believed to have two
risk-reducing effects: shifting banks’ income mix
away from intermediation-based activities would re-
duce banks’ exposure to credit risk and interest rate
risk, and shifting banks’ income mix toward fee-
based financial products and services would reduce
earnings volatility via diversification effects. As late
as 2000, many bankers continued to believe that fee
income would be a stable income stream: “Indeed,
shareholders and analysts alike have grown fond of
the earnings, diversity, growth potential,
and market insulation that fees provide”
(Engen, 2000).
To some extent industry-wide trends
in income mix and profitability offered
superficial support for this view. As
shown in figure 2, between 1980 and
2003 noninterest income doubled as a
percent of total industry operating income
at U.S. commercial banking companies,
while at the same time aggregate industry
profitability (ROE) not only increased but
became more stable. But such an analysis
is indeed superficial and it ignores grow-
ing evidence to the contrary. Recent em-
pirical studies indicate that although an
increase in noninterest income may im-
prove bank earnings, this seldom occurs
without concomitant changes in interest
income, variable inputs, fixed inputs,
financing structure, and other changes that have risky
implications for the variability of bank earnings.
DeYoung and Roland (2001) suggest three rea-
sons that noninterest income may increase the vola-
tility of bank earnings. First, loans that are held in a
bank’s portfolio—especially loans to businesses—are
relationship based. That is, banks have close ties to
their borrowers that allow them to ascertain borrower
creditworthiness by building up a storehouse of pri-
vate information about the borrower and to monitor
the activities of the borrower going forward. Because
these informational ties are costly for both the bank
and the borrower to replicate, relationship-based loans
often have high switching costs. In contrast, some
fee-based activities are not relationship based and,
hence, have low switching costs, such as fees from
originating a mortgage or from non-customers using
a bank’s ATM machines.4 Thus, despite exposing the
bank to credit risk and fluctuations in interest rates,
interest income from loans may be less volatile than
noninterest income from many fee-based activities.
Second, a bank that shifts its product mix from
traditional asset-based, interest-generating activities
to nontraditional fee-based activities tends to increase
its “degree of operating leverage.” For example, with-
in the context of an ongoing lending relationship, the
main input needed to produce more loans is a variable
input (that is, interest expense); in contrast, the main
input needed to produce more fee-based products is
typically a fixed or quasi-fixed input (that is, labor
expense). Thus, fee-based activities may require great-
er operating leverage than lending activities, which
makes bank earnings more vulnerable to declines in
ratio44 4Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
revenues. Third, most fee-based activities require banks
to hold little or no fixed assets, so unlike interest-based
activities like portfolio lending, fee-based activities
like trust services, mutual fund sales, and cash manage-
ment require little or no regulatory capital. This allows
banks to finance a greater amount of their income-gen-
erating activities with debt, which increases fixed inter-
est expenses. In other words, fee-based activities allow
banks to use a greater “degree of financial leverage”
than lending activities.
The theoretical implications of these phenomena
are illustrated in figure 3. Banks with low fixed costs and
high variable costs, that is, a low degree of total lever-
age, are represented in panel A by the solid line (labeled
Bank II). Banks with high fixed costs and low variable
costs, that is, a high degree of total leverage, are repre-
sented by the dashed line (Bank I). Theoretically, banks
with large amounts of fee-based income will have a
high degree of total leverage like Bank I, so that any
given change in revenue (along the horizontal axis) gets
amplified into a greater change in earnings (along the
vertical axis). For example, when sales equals amount A,
both Bank I and Bank II are earning about 5 units of
profit. If sales revenue for both firms increases to B,
Bank I will realize a much greater change in profits,
from 5 units to 25 units, while the earnings for Bank
II will increase from 5 units to about 15 units.
To make matters worse, the distribution of sales
revenues can also vary across banks. Panel B illus-
trates two probability distributions for sales revenue.
The flatter of the two distributions represents sales that
are more volatile, while the more bell-shaped of the
two represents sales that are less volatile, that is, they
will not vary as much around the mean (represented
Bank I has high fixed and low variable costs (high degree of total leverage);













Probability distribution of sales revenue
Source: Modified from DeYoung and Roland (2001).45 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
by the dotted line.). Theoretically, revenues derived
from non-relationship-based fee-generating activities
with low switching costs (that is, home mortgage
origination) or high sensitivity to the business cycle
(that is, investment banking) can be more volatile
than revenues from traditional relationship-based
banking lines of business. A bank with more of these
types of activities would be likely to have sales reve-
nues represented by the flatter of the two distribu-
tions. This would compound the change in profits
illustrated in panel A because sales at Bank I would
be more likely to change from quarter to quarter, all
else being equal.
Using data from U.S. banks during the 1990s,
DeYoung and Roland (2001) find evidence consis-
tent with these theoretical conjectures. They demon-
strated that income from fee-based activities was more
volatile than income related to traditional intermedia-
tion activities (that is, interest from loans, interest from
securities, and service charges from deposits), and that
the degree of total leverage tends to be greater at banks
that generate large amounts of fee income from non-
traditional activities. They find also that the type of
fee-based activity in which the bank engages makes a
difference. Increased reliance on trading activities in-
creases the volatility of overall bank revenues, while
increased reliance on charging fees to depositors re-
duces the volatility of overall bank revenues.
Studies that followed generated similar findings.
Stiroh (2004a) finds that an increased focus on non-
interest income is associated with declines in risk-ad-
justed performance. In another study, Stiroh (2004b)
finds potential diversification benefits for banks that
offer a variety of different fee-based services, but no
diversification benefits for banks that produce a com-
bination of interest-based and fee-based services. In
DeYoung and Rice (2004), we find that increases in
noninterest income are associated with higher, but
more volatile, accounting rates of return, resulting in
reduced risk-adjusted returns.
We also find that an increase in noninterest in-
come does not necessarily indicate that intermedia-
tion activities have become less important at banking
companies. If intermediation activities have become
less important for banks over time, we argue in
DeYoung and Rice (2004), then it stands to reason
that the correlation between bank profitability and
bank net interest margin would grow weaker over
time. But to the contrary, we show that the correlation
of bank earnings (ROE and ROA) and net interest
margin has not grown weaker over time and may have
actually strengthened slightly. Finally, we find that
well-managed banks tend to focus on a narrow set of
fee-based activities, most of which are unrelated to
either traditional core deposit business or trading ac-
tivities. This includes (among other items) fees from
the sale of mutual funds and insurance policies, fees
from securitization activities, income from loan ser-
vicing, fees from providing trust services, and income
from providing cash management services. In DeYoung
and Rice (2004), we conclude that increased nonin-
terest income is co-existing with, rather than replacing,
intermediation activities at the typical commercial
bank and that traditional intermediation activities re-
main the core activity of most profitable banks.5
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Providing payment services is an under-appreciated
source of noninterest income for banking companies
and its importance may be growing. Payment-related
information technology at banks was expected to grow
about 37 percent between 2003 and 2004 (Access In-
telligence, LLC, 2004). Wachovia Corp. reorganized
its payment operations to create a centralized payment
division (Wade, 2003), while Bank of America Corp.
overhauled its internet banking and bill-pay website
(Bills, 2003). As the menu of payment products and
services available to consumers increases, bankers
have recently acknowledged that “only within the last
two to three years has there been a realization of the
importance of payments” (Wade, 2003).
Since customers generally use transaction ac-
counts to make and receive payments, banking com-
panies play a natural role in the payments system.6
And although competition from nonbanks using new
payment technologies has increased, it is likely that
banks will remain primary providers of payment
products and services, because banks have two unique
features with regard to the payments system that
nonbank firms do not share.
First, financial institutions have the ability to
offer settlement activities. Settlement here is defined
as the irrevocable transfer of funds between parties
in a payments system.7 While nonbank firms are
very much involved in the processing of payments
in the U.S. economy, only financial institutions can
settle payment transactions, because all noncash
payment transactions, except for on-us transactions,
require the transfer of funds between two financial
institutions. For example, Fiserv is a large vendor,
or “third party provider,” of transaction services,
such as customer account processing and check pro-
cessing and imaging, but it does not settle checks
with customers’ accounts. Only banks can settle their
customers’ accounts.46 4Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
Second, because the payments system is heavily
reliant upon deposit-based instruments, banks are in
a unique position to profit by cross-selling payment-
based, payment-related, and non-payment-related
products and services to their deposit customers.
For example, banks offer customers a broad menu
of payment methods with which to access the funds
in their deposit accounts—such as checks, debit cards,
direct debit for paying bills, direct deposit for receiv-
ing paychecks, and online bill paying—and offer
payment products peripheral to customers’ accounts,
such as credit cards and home equity lines of credit.
Depending on their business model and competi-
tive strategy, banks can and do charge fees for these
payment-related services. Chakravorti and Kobor
(2003) suggest that banking companies use two dif-
ferent approaches for using payment activities to en-
hance their profits: a stand-alone product approach
and a product-bundling approach. Stand-alone payment
strategies are highly specialized; some examples in-
clude securities processing and handling, management
of large personal and corporate trust accounts, and
correspondent banking services. These lines of busi-
ness tend to generate revenue streams that are inde-
pendent from banks’ other activities and tend to use
specialized (and often large scale) production pro-
cesses as well.
In contrast, banks that use a product-bundling
strategy will market and price their payment products
in conjunction with other retail or wholesale prod-
ucts. Retail products would include, for example, ser-
vices tied to personal deposit accounts, while wholesale
products would include corporate transactions. Al-
though payment products may not contribute directly
to profits in this approach, including them in a bun-
dle of related services can increase the retention of
deposit customers. In contrast to fee-based activities
that are not relationship-based (such as home mort-
gage origination, as discussed above), products and
services linked to deposit accounts can be “sticky,”
that is, they make it less convenient for deposit cus-
tomers to transfer their funds to another institution.
For example, deposit customers that use direct de-
posit and automatic bill payments are less likely to
switch to another institution, because they will have
to incur the costs (time and effort) of undoing these
automated arrangements at their current bank and
setting them up again at their new bank. Banking
companies have become increasingly aware that their
profits can be enhanced by offering costly new rela-
tionship-based services (such as expanded networks
of branches or ATMs) at low prices or for a fee
(where payment is in the form of foregone interest),
because the switching costs associated with these
services can embed the customer more firmly in the
long run (Furst, Lang, and Nolle, 1998; Kiser, 2002;
DeYoung and Hunter, 2003).
Given that banks use payments for vastly differ-
ent strategic reasons, it is difficult to model and mea-
sure how payments contribute to profits. Two recent
Federal Reserve studies have grappled with this problem.
Radecki (1999) estimated that the top 25 U.S. bank-
ing companies derived between one-third and two-
fifths of their operating revenue (noninterest income
plus net interest income minus provisions for loan
losses) from payment-related activities in 1996. This
innovative study was the first to estimate the propor-
tion of income at banks that is attributable to payment
activities, and it made two essential contributions to
our knowledge of the role of payment services in banking
strategy. First, by expanding the definition of payment
activities to include “transaction services performed out-
side a deposit account relationship,” Radecki revealed
the surprising depth of payment activities at large
banking companies. Second, his study reminds us that
payment services are integral to the strategic and finan-
cial functioning of most banking companies, because
they are intertwined with the production of depositor-
taking and information-intensive lending activities.
Rice and Stanton (2003) updated and expanded
Radecki’s study by estimating the volume of payment-
driven revenues at the top 40 bank holding companies
in 2001. In order to obtain a larger sample of banking
companies, Rice and Stanton drew their data from the
financial reports (call report and Y9) that U.S. bank-
ing companies file with their regulators, rather than
relying on banking company annual reports, which
do not offer consistent information on payment-driven
revenues in several important categories. In addition,
these authors adjusted some of Radecki’s approxima-
tion methods, which may have over-allocated some
bank revenues to payment activities. They conclude
that payment revenue accounts for 16 percent to 19
percent of operating revenue—a substantially lower
estimate than Radecki’s but still a surprisingly large
contribution to the overall revenue streams of bank-
ing companies.
Estimating the importance of payment revenues
To estimate the contribution of payment activi-
ties to the income of the 2,662 banking companies in
our sample in 2003, we apply the estimation employed
by Rice and Stanton, using the call and Y9 reports.
(Most of these data are not available prior to 2001.)
The method identifies four separate sources of pay-
ment-driven revenues:47 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 6
Noninterest income items, unweighted averages
All banking Assets < $1 Assets > $1 billion– Assets > $25
companies billion < $25 billion billion
% of total operating income
Noninterest income 20.4 19.0 30.1 49.2
% of total noninterest income
Fiduciary activities 4.2 3.5 9.7 15.0
Deposit fees 51.6 53.8 35.2 17.5
Loan servicing fees 1.8 1.8 1.9 4.1
Investment banking 2.1 1.7 4.9 13.5
Venture capital –0.01 –0.01 –0.04 0.27
Securitization fees 0.2 0.1 0.9 10.2
Insurance agency 3.4 3.3 3.5 2.8
Insurance underwriting 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.9
Gains on asset sales 9.5 9.2 12.0 6.5
Other noninterest income 27.1 26.5 31.7 28.3
Notes: Columns may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding errors. The “other noninterest income” category combines fee income from a
variety of traditional and nontraditional banking activities that are not separately reported to regulators at the banking holding company level,
including (but not limited to) fees for retail services such as mutual fund sales, safety deposit boxes, and credit cards, and fees for commercial
services such as cash management, standby letters of credit, loan commitments, correspondent banking services, and financial consulting.
Traditional service charges on deposit accounts
Traditional service charges on deposit accounts
are composed of two parts: the explicit fees charged
to depositors (displayed in table 6) and the foregone
interest revenue implicitly charged to depositors. It is
easy to overlook the fact that depositors compensate
banking companies for the convenience of having trans-
action accounts by foregoing interest on their account
balances. Customers earn no interest on demand de-
posit account (DDAs) and earn below-market rates
on deposits in negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW),
savings, and money market accounts (MMDAs). These
low-cost funds are key to banking companies’ tradi-
tional intermediation activities, in which they earn
profits by reinvesting these funds in higher yielding
(and higher risk) market-rate loans and investments.
Foregone interest revenue is relatively straight-
forward to estimate. For our calculations we assume
that deposits in all accounts earn the banking compa-
ny the federal funds rate (that is, the bank’s alterna-
tive funding rate). For each type of deposit account,
we take the average spread between the federal funds
rate and the deposit rate and multiply it by the aggre-
gate balance in each type of deposit account. We then
sum up the interest foregone by depositors by account
type: DDAs, NOW and other interest checking accounts,
and MMDA and other savings accounts. These explicit
(service charges) and implicit (foregone interest)
charges on deposit accounts make up the lion’s share
of payment-driven revenue at the typical banking
company. Radecki (1999) contains an in-depth dis-
cussion on estimating foregone interest payments
from banking companies.
Trust and investment services income
Some portion of banks’ income from fiduciary
(trust) activities is payment-related; as such, this should
be included in the aggregate estimates of payment-
driven revenues. Estimating the amount of payment-
related trust revenues, however, is extremely difficult.
Depending on the type of trust account that is managed
or held by a BHC’s trust department, the BHC will earn
a wide range of revenues from payment activities.
At one end of the spectrum are trust accounts, where
no cash will be distributed nor payments made to the
customer in the foreseeable future. A personal trust
containing non-dividend-paying market securities is
a good example—the main fees charged to that trust
by the BHC are portfolio management fees, not pay-
ment-activity fees. At the other end of the spectrum are
trusts that pay out monthly distributions of income to
the beneficiary of a trust account that does not require
much, if any, portfolio management. The majority of
the activity in this type of account is payment relat-
ed, so the majority of revenue earned by the BHC
can be attributed to payment activities.
Because the available data do not allow us to ob-
serve these differences in the intensity of fee income
in the trust accounts of different banking companies,
we create both a high estimate and a low estimate of
these revenues for each bank. At the low end of the48 4Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
spectrum we only include revenues generated from
“custody and safekeeping accounts,” since most of the
revenue earned in these accounts is derived directly
from payment-related activities. We acknowledge that
this excludes payment-related activities in other types
of accounts, such as retirement and corporate accounts;
however, some of these revenues are captured above
as service charges and foregone interest revenues as-
sociated with deposit accounts. At the high end of the
spectrum, we add in revenues from employee benefit
accounts and corporate trust and agency accounts. This
may overstate payment-related revenues, because the
revenues recorded in these additional categories in-
clude fees from some nonpayment-related activities.
Credit cards
Payment-related credit card fees are also difficult
to measure. Fee income from credit cards includes late
payments, interest on credit card balances above the
cost of a traditional loan, finance charges for cash ad-
vances, fees for handling transactions on behalf of
merchants and card holders, and interchange fees for
credit card purchases. Not all of these fees can be con-
sidered payment-related, however, and the situation
is complicated further by the securitization of credit
card assets, which moves a considerable amount of
this activity off of the main balance sheet of the bank-
ing company. The banking company continues to earn
a portion of the revenue from securitized credit card
receivables through the excess collateral from annual
fees and other payment-related service charges, and
so we must account for revenue generated by those
assets as well.
Following Rice and Stanton (2003), we estimate
the payment-related revenue from both the on-balance-
sheet and off-balance-sheet credit card receivables.
Based on data from Visa and MasterCard (Credit
Card Management, 2001), Rice and Stanton estimate
that about 17 percent of all credit card revenues are
derived from payment services. Hence, we estimate
both on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet payment-
related credit card revenue by multiplying total reve-
nue associated with credit cards by 0.17.
ATM revenues
Beginning in 2001, the call and Y9 reports require
that all banks report the “income and fees from auto-
mated teller machines” (ATMs) in the category of “other
noninterest income” when it exceeds 1 percent of
gross interest income plus noninterest income. As a
result, some banking companies show ATM revenues
of zero (or missing), when in fact they are just below
the 1 percent threshold. This will obviously result in
an understatement of ATM revenues in our estimates.
Estimation results
Table 7 displays our estimates of payment-driv-
en revenue for our sample of 2,662 banking compa-
nies in 2003, expressed as a percentage of operating
income and broken out by bank size and payment
category. We find that payment-related income com-
prises about 21 percent of operating revenue.8 Given
that we arrive at this estimation using a modified ver-
sion of the Rice and Stanton (2003) methodology, it
is not surprising that this figure is more in line with
their previous estimates than with the larger estimates
made by Radecki (1999). Still, our estimated figure
of 21 percent remains substantial; it is nearly twice
as large as the 12 percent of operating income that
the average bank generates from fee-based activities
that are unrelated to payments.
The importance and the mix of payment-related
fees vary considerably by banking company size. For
small banks, payment-related income is twice as large
as non-payment-related fee income (21.12 percent
versus 10.45 percent), while these figures are reversed
for large banking companies (17.96 percent versus
38.55 percent). The average small banking company
earns 97 percent of its payment-related revenue through
traditional deposit accounts (deposit fees plus foregone
interest), compared with only about 65 percent for the
average large banking company. The typical large bank
earns the balance of its payment-related revenue prima-
rily through fiduciary income on trust accounts (about
23 percent) and credit card fees (about 10 percent).
Some large banking companies specialize in pay-
ment activities. State Street Corporation, for exam-
ple, is the largest servicer of mutual funds and pension
plans in the U.S., with more than $9 trillion in assets
under custody. It earns an estimated 36 percent of its
operating revenue from fiduciary fees on those custo-
dial accounts. Other large banking companies em-
phasize payment activities from more traditional
sources—for example, as mentioned above, Bank of
America reorganized its online bill payment webpage,
eliminated its monthly fee, and saw its usage more
than double between 2002 and 2003. As a result, the
bank achieved both “higher deposits and the higher
retention benefits” (Bills, 2003).
Conclusions and implications Conclusions and implications Conclusions and implications Conclusions and implications Conclusions and implications
Clearly, banking companies do more than just
intermediate between depositors and borrowers. The
industry has never limited itself to simply earning in-
terest margins, and over time it has moved further away
from that stylized version of “how banks make mon-
ey.” The most telling symptom of this movement is
the remarkable increase in noninterest income at49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 7
Payment-related income, unweighted averages
All banking Assets < $1 Assets > $1 billion– Assets >
companies billion < $25 billion $25 billion
% of total operating incomea
Income from payments-related
  activities (estimates) 20.68 21.14 17.06 17.96
Noninterest income unrelated to
  payment activities 11.76 10.45 20.86 38.55
% of total payment-related income
Deposit fees 56.16 56.32 55.54 44.04
Foregone interest revenue 40.02 40.75 33.98 20.55
ATM feesb 1.93 1.94 2.11 2.06
Fiduciary feesc 1.16 0.62 5.27 23.44
Credit card fees 0.72 0.38 3.10 9.91
aFor the analysis in this table, operating revenue is defined net of provisions for loan and lease losses to remain consistent with the previous
literature on this topic.
bBanking companies report ATM (automatic teller machine) fees only when they are at least 1 percent of total income.
cBased on the “upper bound” estimates of trust revenues.
 Note: Columns may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding errors.
commercial banks, which by some measures now ac-
counts for nearly half of the industry’s income. For
some banks, increases in noninterest income flow
from new lines of business—such as investment bank-
ing, securities brokerage, and insurance agency—that
were made possible by a historic dismantling of re-
strictive financial regulations in the 1990s. For other
banks, increases in noninterest income flow from pro-
ducing traditional banking services—such as securi-
tized lending and electronic payment services—with
new production processes that were made possible by
advances in information technology, communications
channels, and financial processes. Many banks have
done both.
These changes have some surprising implications
for the performance of financial institutions. Conven-
tional industry wisdom held that rebalancing bank in-
come away from interest income and toward noninterest
activities and fee income would make banking com-
panies less risky. Replacing interest income—with its
sensitivity to unpredictable movements in interest rates
and the business cycle—would reduce the volatility
of bank income and expanding into nontraditional fee-
based activities would yield risk-reducing benefits of
diversification. However, recent research suggests
that, at least so far, this has not come to pass. Diver-
sification gains from fee-based activities appear to be
scarce, and although there is some evidence that fee
income can pump up bank earnings, this also tends to
make bank earnings more, not less, volatile.
Perhaps just as surprising is the realization that
traditional banking activities, namely, the provision
of payment services, generate the lion’s share of non-
interest income at most banking companies. We ex-
tend the work of Radecki (1999) and Rice and Stanton
(2003) and find that for the average banking compa-
ny with assets less than $1 billion, payment-related
revenues account for about 20 percent of total operating
income and about two-thirds of total noninterest income.
Of course, the concept of “the average banking com-
pany” has become less meaningful over time, because
technological change and industry deregulation have per-
mitted (and the resulting increase in competition has
encouraged) banking companies to experiment with
innovative products, production processes, organiza-
tional forms, and business strategies. We explore the
implications of these developments in the companion
article that follows, which compares the financial
performance of banking companies across different
business strategies—from community banking to pri-
vate banking to corporate banking and beyond.50 4Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
NOTES
1We start our empirical analysis in 1986 because this is the first year
that detailed financial data are available for bank holding companies.
2We truncated the values of the bank-level ratios at the 1st and 99th
percentiles of their sample distributions (but did not discard those
observations) in order to reduce the influence of outlying values.
3Fees from letters of credit (not shown) increased fourfold at the
average banking company between 1986 and 2003, from approxi-
mately $2.40 to approximately $8.60 for every $1,000 of loans on
the balance sheet.
4See Knittel and Stango (2004) for a discussion of ATM surcharges.
5This finding is reminiscent of the arguments made by Boyd and
Gertler (1994) a decade earlier in a paper titled “Are banks dead?
Or are the reports greatly exaggerated?”
6The payments system consists of a legal framework, rules, insti-
tutions, and technical mechanisms for the transfer of money. As such,
it is an integral part of the monetary and financial system in a
smoothly operating market economy (Hancock and Humphrey, 1997).
7For a thorough review of settlement and clearing systems, see
the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) Re-
sources located on the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
website at http://www.bis.org/cpss/index.htm.
8To remain consistent with the previous literature on this topic,
we define operating revenue net of loan loss provisions in this part
of our analysis. Thus, payment-related revenue is calculated as the
sum of the four payment-related components divided by (noninterest
income plus net interest income minus loan loss provisions). Since
foregone interest revenue is not included on the balance sheet
(banks are not required to account for foregone interest), payment-
related income plus noninterest income unrelated to payments will
not add up to total noninterest income.51 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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